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A B S T R A C T   
The climate crisis demands a strong response from policy-makers worldwide. The current global climate policy 
agenda requires technological change, innovation, labour markets and the financial system to be led towards an 
orderly and rapid low-carbon transition. Yet progress has been slow and incremental. Inadequacies of policy 
appraisal frameworks used worldwide may be significant contributors to the problem, as they frequently fail to 
adequately account for the dynamics of societal and technological change. Risks are underestimated, and the 
economic opportunities from innovation are generally not assessed in practice. Here, we identify root causes of 
those inadequacies and identify them to structural features of standard analysis frameworks. We use a review of 
theoretical principles of complexity science and the science of dynamical systems and formulate a generalisation 
of existing frameworks for policy analysis and the appraisal of outcomes of proposed policy strategies, to help 
better identify and frame situations of transformational change. We use the term “risk-opportunity analysis” to 
capture the generalised approach, in which conventional economic cost-benefit analysis is a special case. New 
guiding principles for policy-making during dynamic and transformational change are offered.   
1. Introduction: The low-carbon innovation policy problem 
The urgency of climate change and the inadequacy of the global 
response has led some to ask, ‘why are we waiting?’ (Stern, 2015). Part 
of the answer may lie in the inadequacy of the tools most commonly 
used to guide decision-making processes (Farmer et al., 2015; Mercure 
et al., 2016). The problem of reducing global emissions of greenhouse 
gases pose three challenges that standard and prevailing welfare eco-
nomics policy assessment methods are generally not in an adequate 
analytical position to address (cost-benefit analysis, CBA (Stern, 2007; 
EPA, 2014; EC, 2015; Nordhaus, 2017; HM Treasury, 2020b), and par-
tial/general economic equilibrium analysis (Château et al., 2014; Krie-
gler et al., 2015; Weng et al., 2018; Takeda and Arimura, 2021)). These 
include the pervasive and transformative nature of the necessary 
changes including non-marginal elements (Fouquet, 2016; IPCC, 2018); 
the highly heterogenous interests of different actors, stakeholders and 
decision-makers (Geels, Berkhout and van Vuuren, 2016); and the high 
uncertainty regarding costs, benefits and path-dependence in the out-
comes of policy strategies (Hughes, Strachan and Gross, 2013). Con-
ventional textbook welfare economic methods, as often applied in 
current policy appraisal worldwide, are designed to analyse changes of 
marginal nature with relatively uniform stakeholders. Change that is 
structurally transformative change may not, however, be successfully 
triggered by informing policy using a paradigm designed for managing 
marginal change (Dietz and Hepburn, 2013). Furthermore, as could be 
observed during both the 2008 financial crisis and the COVID-19 crisis, 
marginal analysis, by ignoring systemic risk, may also be leading policy- 
makers to design fragile systems with insufficient resilience to handle 
increasingly frequent extreme events (Schwarcz, 2019). 
Climate change policy epitomises a need for change in approach felt 
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in several domains of policy-making where substantial change is 
desired, as expressed in current policy objectives in various constitu-
encies, but not materialising. Other areas include innovation policy, 
industrial strategy, finance, infrastructure, regional development, pro-
ductivity growth, and the response to structurally disruptive events such 
as pandemics. Marginal analysis is useful to inform policy over the vast 
domain of economic scenarios where static efficiency is the focus. But in 
the areas of transformative policy-making, marginal analysis is not 
suitable to handle the complex dynamics involved. These problems of 
transformational change require a more general approach, expanded to 
include concerns for dynamic efficiency, with corresponding definitions 
and methods. 
A more general set of social scientific methods (Kattel et al., 2018), 
both quantitative and qualitative, is necessary for these situations, and 
could serve as part of a general paradigm for policy appraisal. An 
appropriate approach would admit the limits to available knowledge to 
adaptively guide the approximate direction of change of a complex 
transition, rather than attempt to identify a highly uncertain distant end 
point with false precision. A practical scientific handling of deep un-
certainty emerges more naturally from complexity science than it does 
from traditional welfare economics (Arthur, 1999). 
In this paper, we identify the scientific basis to manage information 
flow in a policy appraisal framework theoretically compliant with 
structurally transformative situations, which we call ‘Risk-Opportunity 
Analysis’ (ROA). This paper is not a policy or political proposition; 
rather, it identifies suitable scientific methods, drawn from the sciences 
of complexity and dynamical systems, that are coherent with problems 
involving structurally transformative change. A number of methodolo-
gies exists (e.g. Robust-Decision-Making) for analysing decision-making 
options under deep uncertainty (Marchau et al., 2019), to which ROA is 
to some degree related. What these lack, however, is the broad philo-
sophical pedigree that welfare economics possesses going back to 18th 
century, through which much of our present day understanding of 
legitimacy-building in the eyes of the public and public institutions 
during policy appraisal has been developed, as well as the mechanisms 
of the science-policy interface itself. ROA is a generalisation of widely 
used CBA, and therefore benefits from the same intuitive philosophical 
background, while avoiding the most important flaws of CBA when 
applied to problems of transformational change. 
In Section 2, we consider the root causes of the inadequacy of mar-
ginal analysis in the appraisal of policy design for structurally trans-
formative change, using climate change policy as the main testing 
ground. Section 3 sets out the scientific basis of ROA. Section 4 sets out 
the methodological framework of the analysis itself. Section 5 provides 
examples of application and section 6 concludes. The Supplementary 
Material provides further information on complexity science in the 
context of social systems and economics. 
2. Challenges to be addressed by policy appraisal frameworks 
2.1. Preamble 
Basic welfare economics principles, as applied in finance ministries, are 
most useful when  
(1) An intervention does not substantially change the background 
economic situation (e.g. prices of goods and services and GDP 
growth) nor the relationships between variables (Dietz and 
Hepburn, 2013);  
(2) The heterogeneity of affected stakeholders, and of the dimensions 
of policy outcomes, is not highly relevant for decision-makers to 
consider the objectives achieved;  
(3) All parameters and outcomes involved in policy analysis are 
known with sufficient confidence, with quantified uncertainty, 
such that expected values are considered robust. 
For many situations, including notably policy that concerns inno-
vation, these requirements do not hold, invalidating any conclusions 
based on the application of basic welfare economics, either as de-
scriptions of reality, or as normative principles. Three useful definitions 
relate to the reliability of the knowledge that decision-makers use: 
heavy-tailed and fundamental uncertainty, and systemic risk. 
Heavy-tailed uncertainty is characterised by a probability distri-
bution where very large events are sufficiently likely that the variance 
fails to exist. This means that the estimated value of the variance be-
comes larger and larger and diverges to infinity as the sample size be-
comes large. In extreme cases the mean also fails to exist, but even if it 
does exist, the average converges very slowly with the addition of data, 
which makes it unreliable. 
Fundamental uncertainty about the future involves unknown un-
knowns, arising when one cannot enumerate and rank all possible fu-
tures. We propose that fundamental uncertainty is generally related to 
heavy-tailed uncertainty. 
Systemic risk is associated with complex interdependencies within a 
system and can precipitate systemic collapse based on the cumulative 
contribution of certain actions by the individual entities that collectively 
compose that system. It can arise when the actions of any individuals do 
not necessarily pose a risk to themselves directly but contribute to 
forming risks at the community level. Systemic risk is not the aggrega-
tion of individual risk but rather an emergent property of the system that 
arises as an amplification of any such aggregate risk (Cont and 
Schaanning, 2017). 
We acknowledge the existence of a discrepancy between definition of 
‘risk’ used in economics, as the impact of uncertainty on objectives 
quantifiable with probabilities (following Knight), and the definition 
used in most other spheres of society (such as public health, engineering, 
or national security, e.g. the ISO risk management standard), which does 
not require probability to be quantifiable in order for something to be 
considered a risk. For the sake of communicating with policy-makers, we 
adopt the latter definition, recognising that probabilities are rarely 
quantifiable in practice. Meanwhile, we use the term ‘uncertainty’ to 
refer to the range of possible variations in the accuracy of existing 
knowledge and predictions, and not in the sense used by economists 
meaning unquantifiable risk. 
2.2. Understanding dynamically rapid pervasive change 
According to the UK’s Green Book for policy appraisal, itself an 
internationally recognised methodological set of guidelines for policy 
appraisal, marginal analysis is ‘generally most appropriate where the 
broader environment (e.g. the price of goods and services in the econ-
omy) can be assumed to be unchanged by the intervention’ (HM Trea-
sury, 2020b). By contrast, it works ‘less well where there are potential 
non-marginal effects or changes in underlying relationships’. Mean-
while, general equilibrium economic models are designed to handle 
marginal demand, supply and price changes, but do not handle deep 
structural changes in the economy, as they take the structure of the 
economy to be fixed. The 2021 Green Book version sees the inclusion of 
a definition for ‘transformational change’ (Appendix 7), but no meth-
odological steps are recommended yet, a situation perhaps representa-
tive for many science-policy interfaces. 
To understand the mismatch that occurs when a marginal analysis 
technique is applied to a problem of non-marginal change, it is necessary 
to identify the relevant system dynamics and their potential path- 
dependence. 
2.2.1. Dynamics of economic systems 
The economy is characterised by inertia against change, which im-
plies understanding it as a dynamical system (Mokyr, 1992; Grübler 
et al., 1999). Inertia in the economy stems from two broad processes: the 
long-lived nature of productive capital assets required for generating 
return, and the interconnectedness of agents, firms, industrial systems 
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and supply chains/trade networks (Mercure, 2015, 2018). Production 
requires building physical and human capital assets, and this takes time, 
and such investment occurs with the expectation they will be used for an 
even longer period of time. Rapidly changing economic circumstances 
can lead to a devaluation of capital before it has paid for itself. Thus, for 
problems that potentially involve transformative change, understanding 
dynamics is of primary concern, where the dynamic effectiveness of 
policies can be analysed instead of their static efficiency (Farmer et al., 
2019). The static and dynamic efficiency of complex systems is only ever 
knowable ex ante for as long as change is marginal, beyond which it can 
be misleading. 
2.2.2. Path dependence 
Policy action in certain domains almost always has the outcome of 
changing to some degree the problem at hand, creating the need for 
further analysis and further policy action (Rittel and Webber, 1973). 
Playing the game may change the game. For example, research suggests 
that it has been the German introduction of feed-in tariffs that created a 
global market for grid-scale solar photovoltaics, which allowed Chinese 
manufacturers to justify expanding production at a large scale, which 
subsequently resulted in substantial cost reductions and the availability 
of low-cost solar energy to the rest of the world (Yu, Popiolek and 
Geoffron, 2016). A relatively benign climate policy decision transformed 
the whole low-carbon industry and climate change problem, affecting 
the policy strategy of all nations, by opening new opportunities and 
closing older ones. 
Path-dependence is intrinsically difficult to represent in equilibrium- 
based economic analysis, because by definition, the notion of equilib-
rium erases the impact of history, the memory that is embedded in 
economic structure. Seen as an evolutionary metabolic system, as time 
passes, economic evolution identifies the range of what were past pos-
sibilities of what the economy will not become, while it expands the 
range of what it could become - but neither can be exhaustively 
enumerated with certainty (Day, 1992; Arthur et al., 1997; Kauffman, 
2000). In the language of marginal analysis, the constraints of the 
allocation problem that must be solved in path-dependent systems keep 
changing according to the solution that was reached in previous time 
positions. This is a difficult to solve, infinitely recursive problem when 
framed using standard economic optimisation (Way et al., 2019). 
2.3. Addressing normatively highly differentiated and heterogeneous 
interests 
A common criticism levelled against methods embedded in current 
policy appraisal is that it requires normative valuation elements to be 
included in an otherwise descriptive quantitative analysis (e.g. the 
monetary value of risk to life or the willingness to pay for beauty or 
pollination services, see Bateman et al., 2002; Hanley and Barbier, 2009; 
HSS, 2016; HM Treasury, 2020b), valuation that is often ultimately 
interpreted as objective science (Baram, 1980; Ackerman and Hein-
zerling, 2002). ‘Moral’ values (or beliefs) are quantified in monetary 
terms using methods that have frequently been argued as an arbitrary 
choice of the analyst, since beliefs are, strictly speaking, not reliably 
measurable quantities (ibid). Aggregating the value of moral choices 
with real flows of economic quantities may be methodologically 
inconsistent as it can lead to internal philosophical contradictions and 
challenges. For example, the Stern Review (Stern, 2007) involved 
measuring the statistical value of life of affected people which generated 
different values according to ethnicity and social background (Aldred, 
2009), inconsistent with other widely accepted human rights-related 
principles. Both the review’s valuation and human rights are derived 
from normative principles, and they are inconsistent with each other.1 
More importantly, welfare economic valuation methods ascribe 
value to multiple dimensions of policy impacts using only one monetary 
metric that combines all real and moral costs and benefits, with an often- 
unstated interpretation that the resulting quantity represents their 
normative value to society as a whole. Where that quantity remains 
constant, society is interpreted as being indifferent, but this can involve 
substantial underlying structural changes, with winners and losers. The 
normative weighting of different actors’ interests is inevitably a political 
choice, and, where one takes a positivist view of science, this cannot be 
the outcome of any scientific assessment (Ackerman and Heinzerling, 
2002; Pindyck, 2017). In other words, if analysts rely solely on dis-
counted costs and benefits, by including normative elements into 
objective analysis, current appraisal methods are at risk of taking the 
value judgment, and thus agency, away from the policy-maker, and give 
it to the analyst. The former may meanwhile be in need of guidance for 
policy design on how to pursue a range of goals, while the latter could 
become at risk of coming under undue pressure (political or other) to 
shape the subjective component of the assessment in particular ways. 
2.4. Working scientifically with uncertainty 
The concept of Pareto-optimal policy-making, in a strict sense, may 
in some instances be scientifically tenuous, since the possible outcomes 
of policy action cannot usually be exhaustively enumerated and ranked 
(Baram, 1980; Ackerman and Heinzerling, 2002; Weitzman, 2009). The 
aim to deliver optimality may be too restrictive as it can involve unre-
alistically high demands on information availability and reliability, 
while in practice, it frequently leads to the use of some untestable 
proxies for inferring missing information. Meanwhile, the role and value 
of uncertainty as the generator of both risk and opportunity is generally 
missed. By alleviating requirements for optimality, uncertainty could in 
fact be seen as an ally rather than as an enemy. 
2.4.1. Uncertainty is fundamental 
Fundamental uncertainty is an essential characteristic of the econ-
omy (Keynes, 1921; Fontana, 2008) and is present in most policy de-
cisions. Its sources include the development of new technologies; the 
intentions and investment decisions of economic agents; the outcomes of 
entrepreneurial ventures; the future costs and prices of all traded goods 
and services; and the behaviour of the economy as a whole. Possibilities 
are in general not exhaustively known, and therefore probability dis-
tributions around these possibilities are not knowable. Arbitrarily 
assigning probabilities to unknowable quantities can lead to scientific 
inconsistency. 
That fundamental uncertainty cannot be represented using proba-
bility distributions is closely related to the degree of path-dependence 
inherent in the economy. For example, a range of possible values for 
auctioned connectivity broadcasting licences did not exist until the 
mobile phone was created. But moreover, many futures may either be 
distinctly advantageous or clearly disastrous. That probability distri-
butions could be heavy-tailed implies that expected values – and 
therefore discounted costs and benefits – are generally unreliable 
quantities, as they involve adding up large uncertain values with small 
relatively well-known values. 
1 We note that in the UK case, many of these issues are recognised, and the 
current 2020 Green Book takes specific measures to avoid ascribing different 
values to different ethnicities. Furthermore, the Green Book also emphasises the 
importance of considering distributional impacts in decision-making and in-
cludes methodology to address such issues. Other appraisal guidelines else-
where have their own approaches. 
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One crucial consequence of fundamental uncertainty is that knowl-
edge about a system after a non-marginal transformation has taken place 
is inherently less robust than knowledge of the status quo. As a natural 
consequence, the valuation of the predominantly long-term direct and 
indirect benefits of policy action is more prone to uncertainty than the 
valuation of the predominantly short-term direct costs of the same 
policy action. Thus, mis-handling uncertainty may generate, in marginal 
analysis, a status quo bias if the tendency of analysts is to avoid 
including uncertain quantities, or a confidence bias if uncertainty is 
underestimated. This affects particularly innovation and regional 
development policy. 
Experience tells us that the standard response of welfare economics 
analysts to fundamental uncertainty is to make proxies for missing 
knowledge, and impose short-tailed distributions to missing data, since 
marginal analysis requires users to quantify probabilistically all real and 
moral costs and benefits (e.g. measuring the statistics of rare events 
involves long waiting times and is not commonly done). Some of these 
quantities inevitably have heavy-tailed or unknown probabilities, such 
as the social cost of carbon, or the benefits of hypothetical technologies 
that do not yet exist. The pressure on analysts that results from the 
requirement to make proxies when data is unavailable in order to obtain 
results bears the risk of biasing the policy analysis process, and could 
ultimately undermine it. 
2.4.2. Uncertainty has value 
The economy naturally evolves through its attraction towards pro-
ductivity increasing novelty (Schumpeter, 1939; Freeman and Louçã, 
2001). Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in fact make practical use 
of fundamental uncertainty, since business opportunity frequently arises 
through unpredictable events that allow for capturing competitive 
advantage, for instance through innovation. This notion contrasts with 
normative, probability-based standard portfolio optimisation (Marko-
witz, 1952), which requires fully quantified risks. Venture capital would 
likely not exist if probabilities of entrepreneurial success were equally 
known by everyone, as there would be less untapped opportunity for 
creating comparative advantage out of innovative industrial ventures. 
Entrepreneurs do not typically focus on single sources of cash flow 
(excluding monopolies), as they strive to future-proof their enterprises 
by creating new products and capture new markets (Porter, 1996). 
Fig. 1A illustrates a typical business perception of returns on investment 
in research and development (R&D) at the firm level, drawing from 
empirical findings (Klingebiel and Rammer, 2014; Meifort, 2016). 
Investing insufficient resources into innovation leads an enterprise to-
wards obsolescence and eventual failure. Meanwhile, too high an in-
vestment of available resources into too many risky ventures is a gamble 
that leads to a relatively high chance of successive strategic mistakes, 
unproductive investments, and failure. A middle-ground thus exists. 
This behaviour is observed empirically in innovation portfolio 
analysis, where it is observed that a combination of breadth, selective-
ness and innovative intent increases return on R&D investment, due to 
its generation of options (ibid). This can coincide with some types of 
normative portfolio analysis in the context of innovation (Way et al., 
2019). It may be understood as the entrepreneur’s adaptive response to 
strong path-dependence, where strategic re-adjustment takes place as 
time passes, information is gathered and expectations are recurrently re- 
formed (Fig. 1B). A similar logic is known empirically to apply to public 
innovation policy-making (Mazzucato, 2012; Mazzucato and Penna, 
2016): although pressure arises for policy-makers to identify ‘optimal 
policies’, in practice not all policies succeed, while objective value exists 
in trial and error, investing in both high and low risk ventures. 
Fig. 1. Innovation and profitability. (A) Illustration of the profitability of companies in relation to their degree of commitment of resources to R&D investment for the 
development of new products, drawing from empirical studies of innovation systems (Klingebiel and Rammer, 2014; Meifort, 2016). Dashed lines illustrate degrees of 
uncertainty. (B) Illustration of the process of expectations creation and readjustment by agents to capture opportunities as time passes. (Top panel) Agents in practice 
form subjective expectations of the future, with central scenario and limit cases. (Bottom panel) As time passes, agents re-form their expectations adaptively ac-
cording to new information. Red crosses are actual realisations, while curves delimit ranges of possibilities expected by agents. (For interpretation of the references to 
colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) 
J.-F. Mercure et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Global Environmental Change xxx (xxxx) xxx
5
3. Risk-opportunity analysis for informing policy-making 
In this section, we define a risk-opportunity assessment (ROA) 
framework, based on complexity science (see the SM for definitions), 
designed to inform policy-making for problems involving non-marginal 
change, that can be used within existing science-policy interfaces. ROA 
is a generalisation, in fact possibly the only self-consistent generalisation 
one can make, of CBA when in the presence of dynamics and strong path- 
dependence in the economy, and of fundamental uncertainty and het-
erogeneity of stakeholders. When these are not present, CBA can be 
suitable. ROA requires abandoning the standard use of expected values 
on the basis that detailed probabilities are unknowable in general, and 
demands appropriate treatment of uncertainty in each domain of 
analysis. 
3.1. Summary of methodological steps in Risk-Opportunity analysis 
Building upon the standard guidelines of common policy appraisal 
frameworks including the Green Book and the European Commission 
guidelines for policy appraisal (EC, 2015; HM Treasury, 2020b), as well 
as on the above descriptive principles of dynamical systems, ROA in-
volves the following steps:  
(1) Identify the boundaries of the system considered and map out all 
relevant feedbacks between components, considering their mag-
nitudes and directions. Choose or develop suitable dynamical 
quantitative and/or qualitative analysis models and datasets 
accordingly. 
(2) Estimate median (not mean) outcomes and impacts on the pro-
cess and direction of evolution and on the structure of the system 
itself, in a chosen relevant set of qualitatively or quantitatively 
measurable metrics, associated with each comprehensive policy 
portfolio proposed, under various plausible scenarios of eco-
nomic evolution through time. Establish ranges of uncertainty or 
degrees confidence for each outcome metric.  
(3) Carry out, using a stress test or other method, a risk assessment 
for each policy portfolio under study, to identify all possible 
extreme unintended detrimental consequences and worst-case 
scenarios, estimating their severity and likelihood, under each 
dimension considered. This should identify notably the possibil-
ity of reaching tipping points and rapid non-linear changes, and 
their dependence on known variables.  
(4) Carry out, using scenario variation analysis or other methods, an 
opportunity assessment, identifying all possible option creation 
potentials for each policy portfolio under study, under each 
dimension considered. Option creation potentials are elements of 
scenarios and systems that expand the ranges of possible desir-
able futures.  
(5) Report to decision-makers median impacts, direction of system 
change feedbacks, risks and opportunities, in all dimensions 
considered, along with uncertainty ranges and/or confidence 
levels. Report both qualitative and quantitative evidence, against 
current regulatory norms and risk tolerances. The normative 
weighting or valuation of outcomes is not considered part of 
ROA. 
3.2. Taking a systems perspective 
The intended and unintended impacts of policy-making are typically 
felt across several dimensions, such as income, inequality, access to 
stable services, environmental quality, financial stability, health and so 
on. To minimise the chance of missing important impact transmission 
mechanisms, establishing a holistic systems view and system boundaries 
is required, identifying feedbacks between system components using 
multiple outcome indicators that cover the main possible intended and 
unintended outcomes. Furthermore, system changes can include 
structural changes in which the system gradually changes its mode of 
operation. Given the structure of uncertainty, what can reliably be 
analysed is the direction of whole system change in multiple domains, 
with the understanding that the end point is uncertain. Lastly, important 
background changes may exist superimposed onto the outcomes of 
policy action, where the latter may exacerbate or synergise with existing 
background evolution trends. 
For example, from this perspective, imposing a particular policy 
measure to achieve a certain objective (e.g. carbon price to reduce 
carbon emissions) should not be understood to lead to a new static 
equilibrium state of society, technology and the economy, but rather, to 
a new state of change of behaviour, technology and the economy. That 
direction of change may suit some stakeholders and groups thereof, 
while others not, depending on their individual circumstances, motives, 
and aspirations. Particularly, some social groups may have vulnerabil-
ities or states of resilience in various domains, which may be created, 
exacerbated, or mitigated by the policy initiative. 
By taking a holistic systems view, the methodology encompasses the 
broader direction of change induced by possible policy strategies, 
including unintended impacts on different groups of stakeholders, as 
well as the wider range of possible extreme events and vulnerabilities 
associated with newly created systems. Thus, the use of models of 
complex systems by definition generates ranges of path-dependent 
outcomes, feedbacks and structural changes useful to populate a risk- 
opportunity analysis by generating both median outcome projections 
and tail risk analyses. 
In practice this means that policy options are to be assessed in 
combination, rather than individually, and assessed for a whole system, 
rather than limiting the analysis to a subset. Relationships between 
system components are to be mapped and reinforcing and balancing 
feedbacks identified. As opposed to assessing the expected outcome of a 
policy at a moment in time, these approaches can be used to assess 
whether a policy decision changes things in the direction sought by 
decision-makers (the direction of change), how much it changes things 
(the effectiveness), how quickly change happens, how confident one can 
be that this new direction would be taken, and what the risks and op-
portunities are, as defined below. 
3.3. Costs and benefits generalized as risks and opportunities 
Governments as well as other organisations generally find it to be 
part of their remit to consider tail risks, in various domains, generated by 
their actions, although the focus varies depending on the purpose of the 
policy or decision appraisal exercise. For example, central banks have 
recently begun to routinely carry out climate stress test to assess the 
vulnerability of the banking system to climate-related events (DNB, 
2018; Banque de France, 2020; Bank of England, 2021; Dikau and Volz, 
2021). Strategic, regulatory, and budget policy- and decision-making 
are interested in different aspects of uncertainty (Fig. 2). On the strat-
egy side, the focus is on the most likely outcome and direction of change 
induced by a strategic decision. However, regulatory decision-making 
(for example with safety, regulatory norms, compliance, quality assur-
ance and insurance), will typically focus on ensuring that the system 
evolves within certain bounds away from extremes, maintaining suffi-
cient capacity to absorb the impacts of unexpected events (e.g. based on 
estimates of tail events such as the likelihood of electricity black-outs, 
financial crashes, flooding, pandemics). Yet another category of policy 
action will assess whether a strategy fits within existing budgets and 
priorities. For the purpose of the present text, the three classes of policy- 
making functions will be denoted, respectively, ‘strategy’, ‘regulation’ and 
‘accounting’. All three functions and purposes of decision-making can 
make use of risk-opportunity analysis for different but related purposes. 
Generalising welfare economics to complex dynamical systems, an 
accurate and comprehensive interpretation of non-linear dynamics and 
fundamental uncertainty suggests that comparing costs and benefits in 
fact implies a comparison of risks and opportunities. In that 
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generalisation, the standard concept of ‘externality’ encompasses sys-
temic risk, and the risk of reaching a tipping point due to collective action 
(and conversely for systemic opportunity). Probability distributions 
cannot be assumed to be fully known since due to emergence in complex 
systems, one cannot confidently enumerate and rank all possibilities and 
have comprehensive knowledge, even if one can be confident about 
what is likely and what is less likely. Since they cannot be assumed 
known, due to the possible emergence of extreme events, probability 
distributions for costs and benefits must therefore allow for the possi-
bility of heavy tails for any systems with moderately high degrees of 
complexity. Therefore, expected values do not always exist and are not 
reliably calculated, and thus risk is not reliably quantifiable (Fig. 2). This is 
particularly important in the context of the common and standard 
imposition, in present methodologies, of arbitrary probability distribu-
tions onto existing data, especially short-tailed distributions since they 
potentially lead to wrong inferences and underestimation of real risks. 
Where multiple plausible scenarios are generated but expected values 
are not reliable, three useful elements can be informed:  
(1) The confidence that the strategist can have over whether a policy 
adoption will reach a certain outcome and send the system in 
movement in a desired direction that fits current objectives;  
(2) The confidence that the regulator can experience as to whether a 
system will avoid becoming prone to collapse in ways that exceed 
existing regulatory norms;  
(3) The accountant can also assess whether costs, negative outcomes, 
and tail risks of unintended negative consequences overshadow 
benefits and opportunities, and whether outcomes fit within or 
contribute to current fiscal priorities. 
System stress tests can be used to assess risk. Indeed, as is clear in the 
practice of stress-testing, tail risk can be estimated without probability 
distributions necessarily being fully known, notably using network 
models (Battiston, 2017). This complements the estimate of costs with an 
assessment of risks. 
However, in addition to these standard practices, the strategist, 
taking the role of an entrepreneur, can also assess, using this method-
ology, whether policy action is likely to open options for further eco-
nomic and innovation opportunities. That is, without this being the main 
focus, some innovation strategies may offer further potential for op-
portunity generation and economic spillovers than others. This com-
plements the estimate of benefits with an assessment of opportunity. 
For example, a particular low-carbon transition policy strategy could 
have, compared to an alternate approach, different simultaneous types 
of outcomes: (1) it increases/decreases the likelihood of meeting stated 
emissions target; (2) it is more profitable/costly; (3) it makes the 
financial system more/less resilient (systemic risk decreases/increases); 
(4) it decreases/increases energy poverty; (5) as side effects, it creates/ 
destroys, industrial capabilities with more/less potential to generate 
new products, markets and jobs. 
In practice this means that policy options are proposed to be assessed 
upon knowledge of their broader risks and opportunities, not just their 
costs and benefits, and avoid aggregating outcomes over arbitrary 
probability distributions. Specifically, the assessment encompasses ‘tail’ 
risks and opportunities (e.g. tipping points), which may include very 
high impact outcomes, positive and negative (Farmer et al., 2019). 
Reducing systemic risks generally implies increasing systemic resilience. 
The assessment also considers outcomes that can only be qualitatively 
assessed. The assessment is likely to rely on relevant expert knowledge 
and judgment; where this is the best available form of evidence it can be 
retained in its pure form, and not be converted to monetary values. 
3.4. Defining risk and opportunity 
Systemic risk is well defined and managed in risk assessment meth-
odologies (HM Treasury, 2020c). Managing systemic risk is done in 
policy-making in order to design and shape systems in resilient ways, 
which allows them to withstand unexpected situations without leading 
to a likelihood of systemic failure. Systems typically need spare capacity 
to absorb such situations (e.g. during pandemics, or speculative bub-
bles). In many if not most systems, seeking to maximise performance is 
known to affect stability and increase systemic risks (Doyle and Carlson, 
2000; Carlson and Doyle, 2002) (e.g. reducing capital requirements in 
finance accelerates investment and systemic risk). Underplaying heavy- 
tailed uncertainty, and optimising systems based on incomplete 
knowledge, can lead strategists to design brittle systems prone to failure. 
Regulators, if not involved in the design, can inherit a built-in fragility 
challenging to manage, at potentially high costs for accountants and 
Fig. 2. Heavy-tailed risks and opportunities. Illustration of heavy-tailed probability distributions for risks and opportunities. In complex systems, one can rarely 
accurately determine probability distributions, and thus these are shown with truncated unknown heavy tails. This suggests that expected values either do not 
converge or cannot be reliably calculated, but risks and opportunities can nevertheless be critically appraised. 
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society. Uniting risk and cost assessments in the same policy analysis 
framework, including unintended consequences of design, logically 
leads to focusing on improving the resilience of systems. It may help plan 
the direction of development of the economy in resilient ways. The risk- 
opportunity methodology therefore incentivises strategists, regulators 
and accountants to work coherently together. 
Opportunity, however, is a more diffuse concept. Whereas ‘risk’, as 
normatively understood, concerns the likelihood of ‘harm’ to existing 
components of a well-understood system (i.e. the one prevailing at 
decision-making time), ‘opportunity’ concerns the likelihood of de-
cisions resulting in a system which is considered ‘better’ (under certain 
normative criteria) by stakeholders, and/or features more option gen-
eration potential, than the prevailing one. Since a putative ‘better/ 
worse’ system (as normatively understood in the relevant context), after 
transformation, is by definition less well known than the prevailing 
system, a ‘better/worse’ outcome is naturally surrounded by more 
fundamental uncertainty than the status quo. However, the economy and 
markets are systems in continuous change, and entrepreneurs generally 
embrace that dynamism in their search for opportunities (Klingebiel and 
Rammer, 2014; Meifort, 2016). Uncertainty is ultimately inseparable 
from innovation and productivity growth (Fontana, 2008; Klingebiel 
and Rammer, 2014). 
In practice this means that, for example, policy choices with higher 
near-term costs and high near-term uncertainty (such as investing in 
innovation) are identified in ROA for their potential to generate options 
to capture future opportunities with economic returns, while in com-
parison, other policies that have low near-term costs with low uncer-
tainty but characterised only by moderate long-term return can be 
identified as such in ROA. ROA can also caution against policies that 
generate high short-term return with high confidence (such as focusing 
on natural resource exports, or deregulating finance) but that are 
damaging to the economy in the long run as they concurrently lead to a 
systemic risk build-up. Such strategic insights resulting from ROA are 
not commonly obtained using marginal analysis. This information can 
allow relevant stakeholders to achieve stated normative objectives more 
effectively. 
3.5. Complex dynamics 
Fundamental uncertainty implies that distant outcomes are uncer-
tain, success is not guaranteed, and decision-makers can at best reliably 
control the direction of change, rather than the endpoint, and adaptively 
adjust policy over time to achieve stated outcomes. Fig. 3 illustrates as 
an example the understanding of the effectiveness of a pricing policy for 
supporting the diffusion of low-carbon products (green) and the phase 
out of high carbon products (black), from the perspectives of both static 
equilibrium (top row) and a dynamic complexity policy (bottom row) 
assessment frameworks. 
In the static framework, the driver is typically a tax that intends to 
‘internalise’ a stated externality and is understood, in the parent theory, 
to change the relationship between supply and demand accordingly. The 
expected outcome, such as the level of adoption of low-carbon tech-
nologies, is understood to be a unique static outcome of the driver, as it 
settles in a new equilibrium. 
In a scientific context of complex dynamics, a policy change shapes 
driver variables that are themselves dynamic (e.g. vehicle prices 
declining with learning-by-doing cost reductions, which reinforce dy-
namic diffusion processes, which reinforce learning-by-doing pro-
cesses). Scenarios are generated in which uncertainty encompasses a 
range of directions of change rather than a range of static end points. 
Heavy-tailed uncertainty over outcomes exists due to the compounding 
effect of interactions between system components. Thus, a risk- 
opportunity assessment identifies central-, worst- and best-case sce-
narios, without generating a false sense of knowledge and certainty. 
In practice this means that as opposed to identifying new theoretical 
equilibria reached by pricing policy signals, ROA identifies feedbacks 
that control the dynamics of evolution of a system, in order to identify a 
range of new trajectories that a system could take following the intro-
duction of a policy portfolio. This makes use of scenario analysis: 
whether some or all of the scenarios achieve a stated objective; and 
whether opportunities can arise; and whether worst case scenarios fall 
within established accepted bounds of failure. Based on establishing 
system feedbacks and sensitive intervention points, policy space can be 
searched by policy-makers until all stated objectives and standards are 
met under all dimensions of analysis. 
3.6. From one-dimensional to multi-dimensional assessment 
Different stakeholders value different outcomes of policy decisions, 
measured using different metrics, differently (e.g. GDP, health, jobs, 
environment), leading to political debates. In complex systems, each 
dimension has different degrees of uncertainty and tail lengths. 
Combining all metrics into one would also lead to combining their un-
certainties, which could obscure uncertainty analysis unnecessarily from 
Fig. 3. Assessing change in policy assessment. 
Comparison of the process of assessing change in 
policy impact assessment, between the marginal 
analysis framing (top row), and the complexity 
science framing (bottom row), in terms of its 
drivers (left), outcomes (middle) and uncertainty 
(right). This illustrates a situation of impact 
assessment of hypothetical policies for the diffu-
sion of low-carbon innovations. In marginal 
analysis, pricing policies are typically used, 
which change the position of the equilibrium 
between supply and demand of green and brown 
products. The outcome is a well-defined function 
of the driver, with assumed short-tailed proba-
bility distribution, giving a potentially false sense 
of knowledge and certainty. In complex systems 
analysis, the driver itself is dynamic, the outcome 
process can take a range of directions, and the 
true uncertainty, compounding system in-
teractions, is frequently heavy-tailed. (For inter-
pretation of the references to colour in this figure 
legend, the reader is referred to the web version 
of this article.)   
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the perspective of users. For example, the health impacts of reducing 
vehicle pollution in cities and its uncertainty is increasingly well char-
acterised, however the economic impacts of reducing petrol and diesel 
use in certain countries, due to job losses, may be substantially less well 
characterised. Aggregating highly uncertain outcomes with relatively 
well-known outcomes leads to a valuation that is overall highly uncer-
tain, substantially undermining the analysis. 
The assessment of impacts of a policy can be made individually on 
each metric chosen for the analysis, considering (1) intended and un-
intended outcomes, (2) alignment with the direction expected/desired, 
(3) its magnitude, (4) the degree of uncertainty or confidence in the 
outcome, (5) the likelihood of extreme events taking place, and (6) the 
option generation potential. In order to separate assessment from poli-
tics, a multidimensional analysis, estimated independently for each 
relevant dimension, is used. A relative normative valuation of policy 
outcomes can subsequently be carried out separately, with or without 
sophisticated quantitative methods, by independent actors who possess 
the political legitimacy to do so, but this lies outside of the ROA meth-
odology (e.g. see the European Commission’s impact assessment 
guidelines (EC, 2015)). 
In practice this means that analysts report risks and opportunities in 
multiple dimensions relevant to the problem and leave the valuation of 
each of these dimensions to be done by policy-makers. The latter can 
evaluate the information and choices to be made in the context of stated 
multidimensional objectives and their knowledge of stakeholder needs 
and their diversity. 
3.7. Normative principles for policymaking in a context of risk and 
opportunity 
While this paper is methodological in focus and does not itself pre-
sent policy recommendations, some normative principles can be derived 
from complexity science analysis that can usefully frame policy prob-
lems in the context of structurally transformative change. 
3.7.1. Whether to act at all 
The foundational normative principle for policy-making under the 
Coase Theorem and market failure framework is to develop one policy 
response per identified market failure (Coase, 1960; Hanley, Shogren 
and White, 2016; Lehmann et al., 2019). In a complex system with 
continuous endogenous change, or where the exogenous context 
changes faster than equilibrium can be reached, finding the optimal 
policy requires a search through an infinitely large set of possible futures 
branching out from one another. It therefore cannot be identified in 
practice, as the expected future dynamic efficiency of a complex system 
(Abel et al., 1989) can only be known under heavy-tailed unquantifiable 
uncertainty. 
A foundational normative principle suitable for dynamical systems, 
inferred from the use of ROA, is to act to prepare for change that is likely 
to bring about options for change that is desirable, and to avoid change 
that is undesirable (Marchau et al., 2019). This is conceptually con-
nected to the central normative principle of the ‘market shaping’ 
framework (Mazzucato and Penna, 2016) that has been used to support 
the development of so-called ‘mission-oriented policies’, including for 
example the ‘Grand Challenges’ in the UK government’s Industrial 
Strategy (UK Government, 2017). It is applicable as a rationale for any 
policy that is intended to achieve structurally transformative change, or 
that takes place in a context of structurally transformative change. 
3.7.2. How much effort to make 
A basic normative principle of welfare economics is that effort to 
correct a market failure should be applied up to the level at which the 
marginal benefits of action are equal to the marginal costs of that action, 
thereby suggesting that this should be reliably identified. This is 
generally defended on the basis of an idealised normative utilitarian 
moral philosophy framework of social justice. However, given that real 
world agents are not necessarily utilitarians (Sahlins, 1972; Douglas and 
Isherwood, 1979; Wilk and Cliggett, 2007; Graeber, 2014), it is not an 
empirically validated description of human behaviour. 
For non-marginal change, ‘optimality’ cannot reliably be identified 
because outcomes are heavy-tailed uncertain. A second normative 
principle inferred from ROA methodology is that sufficient policy effort 
may be applied to kick-start self-generating change over time (Farmer 
et al., 2019). This considers the observed effectiveness of policy in 
relation to the dynamic processes that it aims to influence in its stated 
objective. Notably, if a government invests in the development of a new 
low carbon technology but abandons support for it before it is success-
fully commercialised, self-generating increasing returns may never 
materialise, and the investment could be wasted. For example, UK 
offshore wind subsidies (see section 4; initially £100 /MWh, or over 
£200/tCO2e abated) successfully helped drive the technology to market 
parity, while the current official value of emissions reductions in the UK 
was £14/tCO2e for the power sector and £59/tCO2e in other sectors. Had 
the official value been used to design the policy to support offshore wind 
following a market failure rationale, it would likely have failed. 
3.7.3. Where to direct the effort 
When a single marginal market failure is identified, standard eco-
nomic theory contends that externality pricing or compensation mech-
anisms can be applied after which the market is expected to allocate 
resources optimally. In cases where structurally transformational 
change is possible (as for instance newly defined in the 2020 update to 
the UK’s Green Book following an internal review, see HM Treasury, 
2020b, 2020a), optimal states are not reliably identifiable, while some 
policies may be more effective in incentivising change towards stated 
objectives than others. A suitable normative principle is therefore not 
allocative efficiency, but dynamic effectiveness (Kattel et al., 2018). It 
may be most effective to act on known points of greatest known leverage 
(Farmer et al., 2019). 
Applied to the pricing value of externalities, this principle suggests 
that the most effective approach may not necessarily be a uniform price 
across the whole economy, as would be inferred from welfare eco-
nomics, but rather, prices targeted in specific sectors, set at specific 
levels that are estimated as likely to catalyse change (Kay, 2012; King 
et al., 2015). For example, in UK electricity, dramatic emissions re-
ductions have been achieved with a total carbon price of around £35/ 
tCO2e, while the existing petrol fuel duty, corresponding to an implicit 
carbon price of £238/tCO2e, and has had marginal impact. This princi-
ple also suggests that there is no reason to expect, a priori, pricing itself 
to be an effective policy, and that other forms of targeted policy may be 
equally or more effective (notably, regulation). That policy should be 
‘technology neutral’ does not appear to be supported by the evidence; 
what appears to matter is to be effective at picking winners not losers 
(Mazzucato, 2012; Klingebiel and Rammer, 2014; Carreras, 2020). 
3.7.4. Economic change, systems design and future-proofing 
There exists a trade-off between optimising the performance of a 
dynamical system under constant observed conditions, and maintaining 
its resilience to unforeseen circumstances (Doyle and Carlson, 2000; 
Carlson and Doyle, 2002). Take for example technology choice in 
climate policy. Recent debate focused on the need for substantial 
negative emissions later this century to compensate for near-term 
emissions, a result from scenarios developed on the basis of systems 
optimisation, ultimately strongly influenced by discounting procedures 
(IPCC, 2018). This may be a risky and false narrative underplaying real 
systemic risk, where emissions today contribute to the accumulation of 
risk of possible future climate tipping points being triggered, a risk not 
fully mitigated by assuming future negative emissions. This suggests the 
principle that optimising excessively the short-term performance of 
policy strategies may affect the long term resilience of the system or 
program. 
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4. Policy domains where ROA could make a difference 
In this section we describe two case studies, to explore both the 
limitations of cost-benefit analysis and equilibrium or optimisation- 
based appraisal, and the potential lessons from the use of a Risk- 
Opportunity Analysis approach. The first is historical, while the sec-
ond is prospective. While space does not allow a detailed application of 
Risk-Opportunity Analysis in these case studies, they provide lessons 
that can help develop and shape Risk-Opportunity Analysis exercises. 
4.1. Looking back: The success story of UK offshore wind policy and 
industry 
In just over a decade offshore wind has evolved from an expensive, 
immature technology, to one that is competitive with fossil fuel gener-
ation. Costs fell from around £170/MWh in 2008, to around £40/MWh 
for projects coming online in the UK in 2023 (Farmer and Lafond, 2016; 
Rechsteiner, 2020; Jennings et al., 2020), cementing its economic 
attractiveness and future contribution to electricity generation, and 
producing the wider economic benefits that the growth of a substantial 
new industry with a global market brings. This outcome is largely the 
result of strong, well-targeted, and sustained policy support from the UK 
government. 
To achieve its legally binding target of 10% of electricity generated 
from renewables by 2010, in 2002 the UK government introduced the 
Renewables Obligation (RO); a technology-neutral tradable green cer-
tificate mechanism providing subsidy to qualifying technologies in 
addition to the market price of electricity. In 2009, when the UK 
formally agreed to achieve 15% of final energy consumption from 
renewable sources under the EU’s Renewable Energy Directive (to be 
achieved through, inter alia, 30% of electricity from renewables), the 
government introduced technology ‘banding’; awarding more RO Cer-
tificates (ROCs) to less mature technologies to encourage their devel-
opment, with offshore wind receiving two ROCs per unit of generation. 
The RO had no cap on budget or capacity, and the government held 
levers to ensure the price of ROCs remained stable. In 2008–09, three 
other key enabling policies and measures were introduced:  
(1) In June 2008, the British Crown Estate auctioned rights for space 
for over 32 GW of wind capacity and invested £80 million of co- 
funding for developments.  
(2) In October 2008, the Offshore Wind Accelerator (OWA) was 
launched jointly by the government and nine leading offshore 
wind developers to accelerate cost reductions and technology 
reliability via RD&D. 
(3) With the EU’s Third Energy Package requiring electricity trans-
mission and generation assets to have separate ownership, the UK 
regulator began awarding transmission operator licences via 
competitive tendering, which allowed low-risk transmission 
infrastructure to receive reduced costs of capital. 
The stability, long-term security, and relative generosity of the RO 
subsidy for offshore wind, coupled with these supporting measures, 
provided developers space to experiment, for the industry to form, core 
technical knowledge to grow, and ‘learning-by-doing’ to develop across 
the supply chain, including in the financial sector (Jennings et al., 
2020). 
In 2013, the RO was replaced by a Contracts-for-Difference (CfD) 
scheme, in which new renewable capacity is sought in ‘rounds’, to which 
eligible renewable generators applied to receive a fixed ‘strike price’ for 
15 years of generation capacity. If the market price for electricity falls 
below the strike price, the government pays the difference. If the market 
price exceeds the strike price, the generator pays the government the 
difference. In 2014/15 the process became fully auction-based, with 
capacity allocated across ‘Pot 1′ (more mature technologies, including 
onshore wind and solar PV), and ‘Pot 2′ (less mature technologies, 
including offshore wind). For each pot, the lowest bids across technol-
ogies received contracts until the capacity available in each pot is 
satisfied. In Round 1 in 2015, 1.2 GW of offshore wind contracts were 
granted in Pot 2–54% of supported capacity (BEIS, 2019a). Shortly af-
terwards, support for solar PV and onshore wind (Pot 1 technologies) 
with the majority of new CfD support then focused on Pot 2 only, and 
particularly offshore wind. In Rounds 2 and 3 in 2017 and 2019, offshore 
wind represented around 95% of all newly contracted capacity (BEIS, 
2019c, 2019b). In 2019, the government and offshore wind industry 
agreed the Offshore Wind Sector Deal (OWSD), guaranteeing CfD action 
rounds every two years to achieve at least 30 GW of deployment to 2030 
(subsequently increased to 40 GW in late 2020, as the first aim of the 
Prime Minister’s Ten Point Plan for a Green Industrial Revolution’, see 
HM Government, 2020), along with measures such as local content re-
quirements and an aim to treble the size of the UK offshore wind 
workforce (HM Government, 2019). 
In contrast to the RO, the CfD mechanism held an explicit objective 
of reducing costs of the now-maturing technology through competition, 
encouraged by a target, set in 2012 by the government’s Offshore Wind 
Cost Reduction Task Force (CRTF), of achieving costs of £100/MWh by 
2020. The CfDs, with the long-term commitments made in the OWSD, 
provided the industry with sufficient confidence to build on the de-
velopments made under the RO regime and invest in future growth and 
innovation. This generated economies of scale in local manufacturing 
capacity, the size of the turbines, and the number of turbines in a single 
project; investment in developing specialist support technologies (such 
as bespoke installation and maintenance vessels) and workforces and 
skills (both of which were previously repurposed from the oil and gas 
industry); and other improvements and efficiencies produced by 
continued learning-by-doing. The stable long-term support regime, 
coupled with increasing project size and accumulating experience also 
attracted a wider range of investors, further reduced finance costs. 
Broadly, the cost reductions achieved have been the result of a 
combination of well-designed and context-appropriate ‘technology- 
push’ and ‘demand-pull’ policies, dominated first by the RO to 
encourage commercialisation, and then by the CfD to introduce 
competition once the technology was near maturity. But, throughout, 
these instruments were supported by both high-level, long-term com-
mitments to the technology, and by more granular enabling measures to 
address specific barriers to development and diffusion. 
A key aspect of this success story is that decisions that led to the 
creation of this policy framework were made based on the need to meet 
overarching legal EU commitments, and strategic considerations on 
which sectors and technologies would be most appropriate to achieve 
these commitments, based on metrics other than static cost consider-
ations. Even considering indirect and non-financial benefits, CBA would 
not likely have supported the policy strategy that emerged, for its lack of 
understanding of business opportunity. Through the initial RO subsidy 
mechanism, offshore wind benefited from £100 per MWh (DECC, 2013; 
Jennings et al., 2020), which corresponds to a subsidy exceeding £200/ 
tCO2e (at the prevailing carbon intensity of power), in comparison to 
the value of carbon emissions in UK policy appraisal of £14/tCO2e in the 
power sector and £59/tCO2e in other sectors, used in CBA exercises. 
Through a traditional CBA paradigm, this would have seemed dispro-
portionately large and unsound value for money when introduced, as 
other emissions reductions options existed at much lower (but static) 
cost. 
Instead, offshore wind cost reduction was an explicit objective of the 
policy framework, alongside the development of industrial and supply 
chain capabilities. In the 2019 CfD auction, Offshore Wind projects 
cleared below estimated wholesale prices, raising the prospect that 
Offshore Wind could be ‘subsidy free’ depending on future wholesale 
electricity prices. New projects are now more likely than ever to 
generate direct revenue to the public purse, with the UK well positioned 
to export offshore wind technology, knowledge and services, to ever- 
expanding international markets. 
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4.2. Going forwards: Transition policies in passenger road transportation 
Technology changes continuously, with or without policy changes, 
as preferences and industrial processes co-evolve with new technologies 
diffusing in consumer and industry markets. Policy can alter and 
accelerate those trajectories. As technologies evolve, costs reduce, 
further increasing their attractiveness to users, creating self-reinforcing 
and path-dependent trajectories of technology evolution. This is 
particularly important in consumer-driven markets such as for vehicles. 
The Future Technology Transformations (FTT) model is a simulation 
model looking at technology competition and diffusion in markets 
(Mercure et al., 2014; Mercure et al., 2018a; Mercure et al., 2018b; 
Vercoulen et al., 2018; Knobloch et al., 2019). The diffusion process is 
modelled through the principle that technology adoption is determined 
by both preferences and technology access or prevalence. However, 
preferences in turn depend on costs and other considerations, while 
technology prevalence determines its availability. In other words, costs 
influence levels of technology adoption while levels of technology 
adoption in turn affect costs. Costs decline through a standard learning 
curve function of the cumulative production of technology, where 
increasing scale of production induces lower costs. The combination of 
both cost reductions and diffusion generates a reinforcing feedback, in 
which expanding scale leads to lower costs which attract more con-
sumers, while more consumers expand the diffusion scale further. 
These co-evolutionary dynamics can lead to avalanche effects, or 
alternatively, failure in the marketplace, depending on a range of factors 
including prevalent infrastructure, policy and consumer preferences. As 
discussed with offshore wind power, sufficient policy support can 
overcome initial hurdles and trigger an avalanche, if it brings its cost 
below parity with competitors, while insufficient or inappropriate policy 
might fail to reach that stage. Furthermore, policy instruments can 
synergise with one another - especially combinations of technology-push 
Fig. 4. Policy portfolios for road transport in five major economies. Derived from simulations performed in Lam & Mercure (Lam and Mercure, 2021).  
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and market-pull instruments, have greatest influence at two different 
points of the innovation and diffusion lifecycle – which can be harnessed 
to accelerate change. However, instruments can also conflict with each 
other, which may decelerate or even halt further diffusion and 
development. 
Financial support can generate avalanches, but non-financial policy 
can also alter the way technologies win and lose market share, for 
instance with regulations, industry mandates and public procurement, 
or other programs that aim at shaping industry and markets. For a policy 
instrument such as a carbon tax to be effective, alternative low-carbon 
technologies or behaviours must be available to consumers. For 
example, if the purchase of petrol and diesel vehicles is taxed but electric 
vehicles or public and active transport options are prohibitively 
expensive, or otherwise unattractive or unavailable, then consumers 
must simply shoulder the cost with minimal benefit. Combining finan-
cial incentives with market-shaping action can synergise in unexpected 
ways. 
Such a proposition is very different from the market failure narrative 
in which one expects to use just one policy instrument per market fail-
ure. With the FTT:Transport model, it was found that multiple financial 
incentives tend to interfere with one another, while taxes tend to syn-
ergise with industry mandates and fuel economy regulations; however, 
these effects are strongly market context and region-dependent (Lam 
and Mercure, 2021). 
ROA can be carried out by searching through policy space, seeking to 
maximise synergies and minimise interference. Fig. 4 shows the impacts 
of different types of policies in FTT over time, as they are sequentially 
added, in five major vehicle markets starting from their present-day 
configuration. What can be seen is that, first, the diffusion of vehicles 
is path-dependent and never in an equilibrium, with or without direc-
tional policies, as different technologies of different competitiveness 
compete in markets with evolving contexts. Second, taxes and subsidies, 
on their own, have some impact at re-orienting the direction of diffusion, 
by re-scaling relative preferences. However, the addition of fuel econ-
omy or phase-out regulations clearly help shape emissions reductions 
further. Most interestingly, it is the so-called ‘kick-start’ EV industry 
mandate policy that really magnifies the effect of the taxes on EV uptake 
and overall emissions (Lam and Mercure, 2021). 
Due to learning-by-doing, the diffusion of EVs eventually can become 
self-sustaining, such that the taxes and subsidies are no longer necessary, 
especially once the numbers of EVs become large, the availability of 
conventional vehicles goes into decline, and the surrounding socio- 
technical system becomes reconfigured. There may even exist a point 
of no return. At that stage, the situation reverses as it becomes 
increasingly difficult for consumers to acquire conventional vehicles as 
they are manufactured in ever smaller numbers, and for that reason, 
their costs increase as vehicle parts become increasingly scarce. 
This path-dependent evolution of technology fleets, which in-
corporates learning, choice and diffusion, is highly non-linear, and 
therefore features important uncertainty. The FTT model could in 
principle be mis-specified, or incorrectly parameterised. Thus, the per-
centage of electrification of fleets that can be expected in 2050 is highly 
uncertain and could turn out substantially different from FTT pro-
jections. Indeed, that uncertainty increases exponentially with the time 
span of the projection, as slightly different storylines differ more and 
more to become entirely dissimilar by 2050. The non-linearity repre-
sented in FTT exists in the real world, and this indicates that there is an 
inherent limit to which technology diffusion can be accurately pro-
jected. This therefore requires to carry out detailed sensitivity analyses 
to provide policy-makers with reliable ranges of expected outcomes of 
policies. 
Additional feedbacks with the economy should be modelled, to 
identify risks of further direct and indirect impacts on jobs, income and 
structural change in the economy, which may warrant the development 
of policies to mitigate wider socio-economic effects (Mercure et al., 
2018a). The system can also be simulated in tandem with other low- 
carbon sectors such as power generation to ensure coherence and con-
sistency and avoid moving risks to other sectors (Knobloch et al., 2020). 
Finally, the wider opportunities of investment in low-carbon mobility 
could be explored in relation with the opportunities generated by new 
technologies, notably batteries, in separate technological sectors. 
An ROA exercise for informing EV policy therefore should take a 
shape similar to what led to the UK offshore wind success story: iterative 
and adaptive policy-making. At each step of the way, uncertainty is 
reduced by new market information, which allows to re-evaluate options 
on the basis of ever-better informed projections using non-linear vehicle 
adoption models. The models are used to evaluate what it takes to reach 
the target (from public budgets, consumers and companies, see (Lam 
and Mercure, 2021)), against the risks and opportunities generated by 
the induced market transformation. Further modelling exercises can be 
carried out to estimate dynamically the risks and opportunities arising, 
with uncertainty bounds, in separate sectors outside of transport and 
across the wider economy (Mercure et al., 2018b; Knobloch et al., 2020). 
5. Conclusion 
The next steps in developing a Risk-Opportunity Analysis framework 
to improve or replace welfare economics-based policy assessment lie in 
laying out a framework development roadmap. This roadmap should be 
co-created in close collaboration with stakeholders and users of the 
framework. Ideally, this should include actors involved in purposes such 
as regulating, accounting and strategising. Indeed, such a framework must 
respond to the needs of existing science-policy interfaces, which must be 
identified using an expansive engagement program between scientists 
and decision-makers. 
A first part of the roadmap must involve an intensive dissemination 
program around the concepts of complexity science applied to decision- 
making (dynamics, heterogeneity, uncertainty). A second part should 
involve developing clear context-dependent guidelines on how to use 
this framework under diverse situations and problems. The risk- 
opportunity assessment framework proposed here is as defensible on 
grounds of social justice and legitimacy as are cost-benefit analyses, 
multi-criteria assessments and other welfare-economics based policy 
assessments. However, it makes more appropriate use of, and is more 
transparent of concerning, imperfect information and uncertainty 
inherent in processes of structural, non-marginal change. 
It may be argued that welfare economics and equilibrium-based 
analysis and decision-making methods have not helped governments 
see clearly the best opportunities to drive the rapid, structural techno- 
economic change that is needed to meet climate change goals. As 
Stern writes, ‘The economic response [to climate change] has to be very 
large, involve dynamic increasing returns, changed economic and urban 
organisation and design, and the avoidance of potential lock-ins’ but ‘we 
have seen models predominate where these elements, the guts of the story, are 
essentially assumed away’ (Stern, 2018). When society faces great chal-
lenges, economic analysis that assumes away the most important con-
siderations can lead to unease and distrust of economics and economists 
on the part of policy-makers and the public (Haldane and Turrell, 2018). 
A stronger science-based decision framework may be an important part 
of the solution. 
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